Reloads a Prometheus server in a controlled and configurable way.

Prometheus Config Reloader

prometheus-config-reloader:0.94.1-22.4

bash

bash-sh

ca-certificates-mozilla-prebuilt

coreutils

filesystem

glibc

gpg-pubkey

libacl1

libattr1

libcap2

libgcc_s1

libgmp10

libncurses6

libpcre2-8-0

libreadline7

libselinux1

libstdc++6

prometheus-config-reloader-0

skelcd-EULA-bci

sles-release

system-user-root

terminfo-base

HTTP/2 servers could end up crashing due to inadvertently modifying its HPACK encoder concurrently. This happens because the server modifies the HPACK encoder from two goroutines without synchronization: one uses the encoder to encode a HEADERS frame as part of a response sent to a client and the other modifies the encoder's table size when handling a SETTINGS frame containing SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE that a client sends. A malicious client can repeatedly send a request while changing the header table size to crash the server.

CVE-2026-97032

Historically, we have been rather lax about malformed framing-related headers in our HTTP/2 implementation, as they cannot interfere with HTTP/2 framing. However, this makes it possible for our HTTP/2 implementation to forward responses containing such headers to an HTTP/1 client when acting as a reverse proxy. If the HTTP/1 client also does not behave strictly enough, this can result in response smuggling.

CVE-2026-78660

The HTTP/2 server can refund connection-level flow control twice for the same data: Once when a client resets a stream (refunding data for any sent-but-unread portion of the stream), and again when a request handler reads the buffered data. A malicious client can exploit this to bypass the configured connection-level flow control limit (MaxReceiveBufferPerConnection). Total buffered data is still limited by the concurrent stream limit and stream-level flow control.

CVE-2026-78663

Previously, a channel registered in the mux's chanList is not usable until it is established. A malicious peer was able flood the channel's incomingRequests, deadlocking the entire connection. Now, we add an atomic established state, set when a channel becomes usable. Until such a time, handlePacket drops every packet other than the open confirmation/failure, without blocking and without tearing down the connection.

CVE-2026-78662

When "Trailer" headers are sent by a client, the HTTP server internally uses the header values to populate the Request.Trailer map passed to the server handler. Because Request.Trailer is a map, each entry incurs memory overhead. For HTTP/2 servers, a malicious client can exploit this by sending a "Trailer" header that declares a large number of fields, causing the server to allocate a disproportionate amount of memory while bypassing Server.MaxHeaderValueCount and Server.MaxHeaderBytes limits. This exploit is not applicable for HTTP/1 servers, which do not support multiplexing a large number of requests over one TCP connection, and whose Server.MaxHeaderBytes are calculated differently.

CVE-2026-78659

Previously, after a channel has been established, a malicious peer could send crafted messages that would deadlock the entire connection. Now, we handle all RFC 4254 channel messages; global requests are handled explicitly. Then, treat all other messages as a protocol error and tear the connection down instead of buffering and blocking.

CVE-2026-56855

The golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp package is unsafe by design, has numerous known security issues, is not maintained, and should not be used.

If you are required to interoperate with OpenPGP systems and need a maintained package, consider github.com/ProtonMail/go-crypto/openpgp which is a maintained fork that aims to be a drop-in replacement for this package.

GO-2026-5932

A malicious HTTP/2 peer can cause excessive CPU consumption in the client or server by opening a large number of streams and then sending many small SETTINGS frames containing SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE values.

prometheus-config-reloader:0.94.1-22.4

Attestation